SUPPRESSION OF FREE TWEETS: HOW PACKINGHAM
IMPACTS THE NEW ERA OF GOVERNMENT SOCIAL
MEDIA AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Elise Berry*
With the growing number of social media channels available for
members of the public to voice their opinion, it is no surprise there have
been questions as to social networking’s compatibility with the First
Amendment. The most recent issue that has come to light is whether
public officials who ban or block users from their official social media
pages risk facing a First Amendment violation. 1 One example is President
Donald Trump’s use of his Twitter account to block certain Twitter users
from accessing his page or responding to his “tweets.” President Trump
has allegedly blocked at least eighty users from his Twitter, 2 and many of
those blocked allege it was done in retaliation against their critical
responses. 3 Some of these users have initiated a lawsuit against President
Trump, former White House Press Secretary, Sean Spicer, and White
House Director of Social Media and Assistant to the President, Daniel
Scavino. 4 Asserting that the President’s Twitter is a public forum,
plaintiffs argue that by blocking them for their critical remarks, the
President engaged in viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First
Amendment. 5

* J.D. Candidate 2019, Florida State University College of Law. I would like to thank Professor Nat
Stern for advising me on this Note and teaching me the fundamentals of constitutional law.
1. See, e.g., Davison v. Loudoun Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 706 (E.D. Va.
2017), appeal docketed, No. 17-2003 (4th Cir. Aug. 29, 2017).
2. Kevin Poulsen, Tracker for Twitter Users Blocked by @realDonaldTrump,
TRUMPBLOCKS.ME, https://trumpblocks.me/ (last visited Dec. 26, 2017).
3. See Diana Pearl, A Cancer Patient, Rosie O’Donnell and More Critics President Trump
Has Blocked on Twitter, PEOPLE POLITICS (Sep. 20, 2017, 6:18 PM), http://people.com/
politics/people-president-trump-blocked-twitter-chrissy-teigen-stephen-king/.
4. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia
Univ., v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-05205 (S.D. N.Y. July 11, 2017), https://assets.documentcloud.org/
documents/3892179/2017-07-11-Knight-Institute-Trump-Twitter.pdf.
5. Id. at 2-3.
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Social media’s intersection with the First Amendment has become
an increasingly popular topic among lower courts in recent years, 6 and the
Supreme Court’s silence on the issue had led legal researchers to theorize
the scope of First Amendment protection as applied to online speech. 7
However, in its recent decision in Packingham v. North Carolina,8 the
Court ruled that access to the Internet and social media is a
constitutionally protected right. 9 Packingham illustrates a vast shift in the
Court’s First Amendment analysis by embracing social media and the
Internet as “the most important places (in a spatial sense)” to exercise First
Amendment rights. 10 In particular, the Court recognized that social
networking sites like Facebook and Twitter play a significant role in
providing users the opportunity to engage in political activism and public
debate. 11
One month after the Packingham decision, a Virginia district court
in Davison v. Loudoun County Board of Supervisors 12 held that a county
official’s act of blocking a user from her county official Facebook page
for criticism was unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. 13 The court
cited Packingham for the proposition that social media opens a digital
forum for the exchange of ideas, demonstrating the impact Packingham
will continue to have on the lower courts. 14
This Note will analyze the public forum doctrine and examine
Packingham’s impact on its application in the new era of social media,
particularly one maintained by a public official. Part I is a summary of the
6. See, e.g., Grutzmacher v. Howard Cty., 851 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2017) (public employee’s
racially insensitive Facebook status and “like” of a disrespectful picture was not protected speech
under the First Amendment); Liverman v. City of Petersburg, 844 F.3d 400 (4th Cir. 2016) (finding
police department’s social networking policy restricted officers’ right to speak on matters of public
concern); Palmer v. Cty. of Anoka, 200 F. Supp. 3d 842, 844 (D. Minn. 2016) (finding public
employee’s termination for statements made on Facebook was not in violation of the First
Amendment).
7. See, e.g., Benjamin Jackson, Censorship and Freedom of Expression in the Age of
Facebook, 44 N.M.L. REV. 121 (2014) (arguing that First Amendment protections should extend to
social media communications); Lyrissa Lidsky, Public Forum 2.0, 91 B.U.L. REV. 1975 (2011)
(analyzing First Amendment implications by applying the public forum doctrine to social media).
8. 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017).
9. The Court invalidated a state statute that prohibited convicted sex offenders from accessing
social media on the ground that its prohibition was overly-broad. Id. at 1737-38.
10. Id. at 1735.
11. See id. (noting that Twitter allows users to petition their elected representatives and engage
in political debates).
12. 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 706 (E.D. Va. 2017), appeal docketed, No. 17-2003 (4th Cir. Aug.
29, 2017).
13. Id. at 717 (“By prohibiting Plaintiff from participating in her online forum because she
took offense at his claim . . . Defendant committed a cardinal sin under the First Amendment.”).
14. See id. at 716.
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public forum doctrine and its evolution through the years. Part II will
explain when the government may speak with less constitutional
restrictions and whether it would apply to a public official’s social media.
Part III will discuss the Supreme Court’s protection of political speech
against government censorship. Part IV will provide a summary of
Packingham v. North Carolina and its potential impact on the public
forum doctrine’s application to a public official’s social media. Finally,
Part V will analyze whether the President, the highest-ranked public
official, violates the First Amendment by excluding users from his public
social media account. This Note concludes by offering a new approach for
finding a public forum in a government official’s social media.
I. PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE
If the government opens a forum for public discussion, the First
Amendment applies a stricter standard of scrutiny for excluding speech
than when it opens a nonpublic forum. Regardless of its public or
nonpublic status, however, the government is prohibited from restricting
speech because of its viewpoint. In 1983, the Supreme Court in Perry
Education Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n 15 articulated a
framework for the public forum doctrine, identifying three categories of
fora that apply different protections under the First Amendment. While a
public forum has been applied to government-owned property, the Court
has made clear that a forum may occupy a “metaphysical” space,16 or even
a privately-owned property leased by the government. 17 Therefore, the
doctrine may well apply to a public official’s social media, despite the
website’s private ownership. 18
A.

Traditional Public Forum

The first category is the traditional public forum, articulated as public
places “which by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted

15. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
16. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995) (finding
a student newspaper to be a designated public forum).
17. See Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555 (1975) (finding a privately-owned
theater leased by the city to be a public forum); Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v.
F.C.C., 518 U.S. 727, 792 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part) (public fora are not “limited to
property owned by the government.”).
18. Lidsky, supra note 7, at 1996 (“Just as the government can rent a building to use as a forum
for public debate and discussion, so, too, can it ‘rent’ a social media page for the promotion of public
discussion.”).
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to assembly and debate.” 19 The traditional public forum receives the
greatest First Amendment protection against restricted speech, requiring
the government to show any restriction on speech is “necessary to serve a
compelling state interest” and “content-neutral,[and] narrowly tailored to
serve a significant government interest.” 20 In other words, any regulation
of the content of speech is subject to strict scrutiny. 21 In Perry, the Court
considered streets and parks to be the “quintessential public forums” for
expression, 22 which was widely interpreted as limiting traditional public
forums to streets, parks, sidewalks, or other government property. 23
However, these public spaces alone are not sufficient to achieve
traditional public forum status. Instead, the public property must possess
characteristics of areas that are “traditionally open to expressive
activity.” 24
This emphasis on tradition and historical use has been an important
factor in the Court’s traditional public forum analysis, particularly where
the governmental property at issue is a modern concept or a relatively new
technology. For instance, the Court has refused to extend traditional
public forum status to an airport terminal because, “given the lateness with
which the modern air terminal has made its appearance, it hardly qualifies
for the description of having ‘immemorially . . . time out of mind’ been
held in the public trust and used for purposes of expressive activity.” 25
The Court has used this same rationale to reject its application to a
broadcasted debate,26 specialty license plates,27 and a public library’s
Internet access. 28 As the Court recognized in United States v. American
Library Ass’n:

19. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (citing Hague
v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)).
20. Id. (“In places which by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly
and debate, the rights of the state to limit expressive activity are sharply circumscribed.”).
21. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 818 (1985) (Powell,
J., concurring) (“In a traditional public forum, the government rarely could offer as a compelling
interest the need to reserve the property for its normal uses, because expressive activity of all types
traditionally has been a normal use of the property.”).
22. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
23. See Michael Friedman, Dazed and Confused: Explaining Judicial Determinations of
Traditional Public Forum Status, 82 TUL. L. REV. 929, 946-47, 956 (2008).
24. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 727 (1990) (refusing to find traditional public
forum for a Postal Office sidewalk that led from the parking lot to the front door).
25. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 680 (1992) (quoting
Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)).
26. Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998).
27. Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2250 (2015).
28. United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003).
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Internet access in public libraries is neither a “traditional” nor a
“designated” public forum. First, this resource—which did not exist
until quite recently—has not “immemorially been held in trust for the
use of the public and, time out of mind, . . . been used for purposes of
assembly, communication of thoughts between citizens, and discussing
public questions.” We have “rejected the view that traditional public
forum status extends beyond its historic confines.” The doctrines
surrounding traditional public forums may not be extended to situations
where such history is lacking. 29

Nevertheless, the Court has stated that the “principal purpose of
traditional public fora is the free exchange of ideas.” 30 Given the spatial
ability of citizens to access social media for the intended purpose of
expressing their views on important issues, it is not inconceivable for a
public official’s social media account to obtain the same standard of
scrutiny that is applied to a traditional public forum. 31 The Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Packingham v. North Carolina makes this a
particularly compelling argument given the Court’s elevated stance on
social media as “the most important place[] (in a spatial sense) for the
exchange of views,” comparing it to streets and parks. 32
B.

Designated Public Forum

The second category of public fora applies to circumstances in which
the government has opened non-traditional public property “for use by the
public as a place for expressive activity.” 33 In Perry, the Court explained
that the First Amendment “forbids a state to enforce certain exclusions
from a forum generally open to the public even if it was not required to
create the forum in the first place.” 34 However, “[a] public forum may be
created for a limited purpose,” such as restricting the forum to “certain
groups” or for certain topics. 35 When the government opens a nontraditional forum, “it is bound by the same standards as apply in a
29. Id. at 205-06 (multiple citations omitted).
30. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985).
31. See Noah D. Zatz, Sidewalks in Cyberspace: Making Space for Public Forums in the
Electronic Environment, 12 HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 149, 200-01 (1998) (arguing that, given the mass
access that the Internet provides to speakers on the general public for public debate, a framework to
the traditional public forum should apply to the Internet).
32. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017); id. at 1737 (“These
websites can provide perhaps the most powerful mechanisms available to a private citizen to make
his or her voice heard.”).
33. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educs.’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 45, n.7.
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traditional public forum.” 36 In other words, strict scrutiny applies when
the government restricts speech in an area it designates for public
discussion, but unlike the traditional public forum, the government may
close the forum at its discretion.
The Supreme Court has held that “the government does not create a
[designated] public forum by inaction or by permitting limited discourse,
but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public
discourse.” 37 Government intent has been discerned by looking to the
government’s policy and procedure and “the nature of the property and its
compatibility with expressive activity.” 38 In determining whether a public
forum has been created, the Court has also distinguished between
“selective access,” which would indicate a nonpublic forum, from
“general access,” which indicates a designated public forum. 39 That is, a
designated public forum is created when the government makes its
property “generally available” to a certain class of speakers, but not when
the government requires permission to its property, which it reserves for
a particular class of speakers. 40 Accordingly, a designated public forum
requires the government’s intent to make its property “generally
available” to the public.
C.

Limited Public Forum

While the Supreme Court has had trouble distinguishing between the
limited public forum and the other non-traditional fora, 41 the labels are
merely a matter of semantics. 42 Ultimately, the Court looks to whether the
property involved is open to the public (either by tradition or designation),
in which case strict scrutiny applies, or closed (limited to a specific
purpose, specific topic, or specific speakers), in which case the restricted
speech must only be reasonable and viewpoint neutral. 43
36. Id. at 46.
37. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985).
38. Id.
39. Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 679 (1998).
40. Id.
41. Compare Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 225051 (2015) (distinguishing between traditional, designated, limited, and nonpublic fora) with Am.
Freedom Def. Initiative v. King Cty., Wash., 136 S. Ct. 1022, 1022 (2016) (Thomas, J. dissenting)
(equating the limited public forum to a nonpublic forum).
42. See Mark Rohr, First Amendment Fora Revisited: How Many Categories Are There?, 41
NOVA L. REV. 221, 232-33 (2017) (noting that the limited and non-public fora lead to the same judicial
analysis); Lidsky, supra note 7, at 1984 n.46 (noting that the designated public forum operates no
differently than the traditional public forum, and that the only “constitutional difference” is that the
designated public forum may be closed completely).
43. See Rohr, supra note 42, at 233.
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Nonpublic Forum

The nonpublic forum has been characterized as government owned
or controlled property that is neither by tradition nor designation a forum
for public communication. 44 Unlike the traditional and designated public
fora, the government “may reserve the forum for its intended purposes,”
so long as the restrictions are reasonable and viewpoint-neutral. 45 While
the nonpublic forum has the broadest discretion, viewpoint discrimination
is prohibited in all fora. 46 Viewpoint discrimination is found where there
is an exclusion based on a speaker’s perspective on a certain topic, and is
presumed to be unconstitutional when “directed against speech otherwise
within the forum’s limitations.” 47 Thus, any restriction on speech that
opposes one viewpoint over another is subject to a heightened scrutiny,
and likely to be found unconstitutional. 48
II. SPEECH ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE GOVERNMENT
A.

Government Speech Doctrine

When it is determined that the government itself is speaking, either
through its statements, actions, or funding, the prohibition against
viewpoint discrimination does not apply. The rationale is that the
government must be free to say what it wishes in order to perform its
functions efficiently and govern properly. 49 Understandably, this
relatively new doctrine has created tension with the public forum doctrine;
where one flatly prohibits the government’s exercise of viewpoint
discrimination, the other broadly permits its use.

44. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
45. Id.
46. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985) (“[T]he
government violates the First Amendment when it denies access to a speaker solely to suppress the
point of view he espouses on an otherwise includible subject.”).
47. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995).
48. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“If there is a bedrock principle underlying
the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply
because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”).
49. See Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 598 (1998) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (“It is the very business of government to favor and disfavor points of view.”); Amy Riley
Lucas, Specialty License Plates: The First Amendment and the Intersection of Government Speech
and Public Forum Doctrines, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1971, 1976 (2008) (“Were the government required
to [consider viewpoints], its operations would slow to a crawl, and endless time would be spent
evaluating choices rather than making decisions.”).
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The Supreme Court first addressed this conflict in Pleasant Grove
City, Utah v. Summum, 50 which featured a public park—a place the Court
considers the “quintessential” public forum. 51 The City denied a religious
organization’s request to build a religious monument in the park, despite
the City’s adoption and display of a Ten Commandments monument. 52
The majority upheld the City’s denial of the monument, explaining how
governments have traditionally used monuments to speak to the public,
and the selective acceptance of these monuments are meant to convey the
government’s message. 53 Acknowledging that “[t]here may be situations
in which it is difficult to tell whether a government entity is speaking on
its own behalf or is providing a forum for private speech,” 54 the Court
nevertheless held that forum analysis “does not apply to the installation of
permanent monuments on public property.” 55 Although the Court looked
to the government’s historical use of monuments to speak to the public
and its exercise of selectivity in adopting them, 56 the Court’s reasoning
for rejecting the forum analysis also relied on the unreasonable
consequence of a contrary holding. 57
The Court’s decision in Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of
Confederate Veterans, Inc. also rejected the applicability of the forum
analysis and found government speech in state-issued specialty license
plates designed by private speakers. 58 The Court established a three-factor
inquiry for determining when the government is speaking: (1) the history
of the government’s use of the property; (2) the reasonable observer’s
interpretation of the property as the government’s own; and (3) the
government’s direct control of the message, which may amount to mere
“final approval authority.” 59
Walker has been criticized for setting a low bar for the government
to take advantage of discrimination against private speech by adopting it

50. 555 U.S. 460 (2009).
51. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
52. Summum, 555 U.S. at 465.
53. Id. at 472.
54. Id. at 470.
55. Id. at 480.
56. Id. at 470-71.
57. Id. at 480 (“[W]here the application of forum analysis would lead almost inexorably to
closing of the forum, it is obvious that forum analysis is out of place.”). This pragmatic approach is
said to drive the Court’s First Amendment analysis. See Helen Norton & Danielle Keats Citron,
Government Speech 2.0, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 899, 915 (2010) (explaining how the Court makes
decisions that produce reasonable results).
58. 135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015).
59. Id. at 2248-49.
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as its own. 60 However, the Court’s recent decision in Matal v. Tam 61
acknowledged the doctrine’s susceptibility for “dangerous misuse” and
refused to find government speech in federally registered trademarks. 62
Applying the Walker test, the Court determined that trademarks are
neither traditionally used to convey a government message, nor
commonly associated with the government; rather, the government
registers a trademark without regard to whether it conveys a consistent
viewpoint with its government policy. 63
When applying the Walker test to a public official’s social media, it
is important to note that the relevant speech analyzed are not the posts
created by the public official, but the responses by private users.
Therefore, the government speech doctrine does not provide any
protection for a public official’s viewpoint-based exclusion from his or
her social media page. 64 First, social media has not “traditionally been
used to convey a [g]overnment message.” 65 Second, the comments and
responses made by other users on the public official’s page are not
“closely identified in the public mind” as to be confused with the
government’s own message. 66 Finally, the public official does not
maintain “direct control over the messages conveyed.” 67 While the public
official may have the power to delete comments and block users, it has no
ability to edit the comments made by other users on his page. 68
60. See id. at 2255-56 (Alito, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for classifying private
speech as government speech and stripping it of all First Amendment protection); Leslie Gielow
Jacobs, Government Identity Speech Programs: Understanding and Applying the New Walker Test,
44 PEPP. L. REV. 305, 331 (stating that Walker sets no limitation to the government’s exercise of
viewpoint discrimination when adopting private speech as its own). But see Erwin Chemerinsky, The
First Amendment in the Era of President Trump, 94 DENV. L. REV., 553, 558-62 (2017) (suggesting
the Court applies special deference to government speech over private speech when the institutional
interests of the government are at stake).
61. 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
62. Id. at 1758, 1760 (“Holding that the registration of a trademark converts the mark into
government speech would constitute a huge and dangerous extension of the government-speech
doctrine.”).
63. Id. at 1758-59.
64. However, government speech has been found in government websites. See Sutliffe v.
Epping Sch. Dist., 584 F.3d 314, 329 (1st Cir. 2009) (upholding town’s refusal to add hyperlink to
town’s official website); Page v. Lexington Cty. Sch. Dist. One, 531 F.3d 275 (4th Cir. 2008) (school
district’s website retained “sole control” of including links on its website).
65. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1760.
66. Id. (quoting Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2249
(2015)). Since users on Facebook and Twitter have distinct usernames and pictures accompanying
these responses on the public official’s page or posts, there is no reason to believe these messages
would be mistaken for the government’s own.
67. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2249.
68. See Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1758 (“The Federal Government does not dream up these marks,
and it does not edit marks submitted for registration.”).
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State Action/Color of Law

A constitutional right is only protected if the “the conduct allegedly
causing the deprivation” is “fairly attributable to the State.”69 Private
conduct, “however discriminatory or wrongful,” is afforded no such
protection. 70 State action may be found “if there is such a close nexus
between the State and the challenged action that seemingly private
behavior may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” 71 Social media
is no exception to the state action doctrine, since “[t]he test is not the form
in which state power has been applied but, whatever the form, whether
such power has in fact been exercised.” 72
Therefore, for users banned from a public official’s social media to
successfully allege a constitutional violation, they must first demonstrate
that the public official maintained the social media page in his or her
official capacity and not as a personal account. The district court in
Davison v. Loudoun County Board of Supervisors 73 looked at several
factors 74 in finding that the county official operated her Facebook page
“while purporting to act under the authority vested in [her] by the state.” 75
The court rejected the county official’s argument that the page was
entirely private, even if she maintained the webpage “outside of both her
office and normal working hours.” 76
III. POLITICAL SPEECH AND THE PROTECTION AGAINST GOVERNMENT
CENSORSHIP
The First Amendment protects the right of a private individual to
speak freely on matters of public debate without fear of censorship,

69. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
70. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).
71. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001)
(internal quotations omitted) (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974)).
72. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964).
73. 267 F. Supp. 3d 702 (E.D. Va. 2017), appeal docketed, No. 17-2003 (4th Cir. Aug. 29,
2017).
74. These factors included: the page being named under the official title of the County Chair;
the categorization of the page was that of a government official’s; the page included the county phone
number and official county email and website link; the posts were directed to the county constituents,
spoke on behalf of the county Board of Supervisors as a whole, encouraged “back and forth
constituent conversations,” and related to matters regarding the county official’s office. Id. at 714.
75. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Hughes v. Halifax Cty. Sch. Bd., 855 F.2d 183,
186-87 (4th Cir. 1988)).
76. Id. at 712.
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government suppression, or retaliation. 77 This is the principle for
affording heightened scrutiny to viewpoint discrimination. 78 The Supreme
Court has demonstrated significant concern for ruling in a way that could
potentially chill speech, particularly when it involves public or political
matters. 79
Political speech is said to be “at the core of what the First
Amendment is designed to protect.” 80 It is therefore entitled to the greatest
constitutional protection against speech restriction in order to assure the
“unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and
social changes desired by the people.” 81 That is, when a law negatively
impacts political speech, the Court applies “exacting scrutiny,” requiring
the government to show the restriction is “narrowly tailored to serve an
overriding state interest.” 82 A similar rationale was used to adopt a
heightened standard for defamation claims by public officials in what is
considered one of the greatest First Amendment decisions in American
history, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 83
A.

Criticism of Public Officials: New York Times Co. v. Sullivan

In 1964, the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan presented the question of whether a public official may
bring a libel action against critics of his official conduct. 84 Recognizing
77. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (“The protection given speech and
press was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and
social changes desired by the people.”).
78. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 894 (1995) (Souter,
J., dissenting) (“[T]he prohibition on viewpoint discrimination serves that important purpose of the
Free Speech Clause, which is to bar the government from skewing public debate.”).
79. See Sec’y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 956 (1984) (“[W]hen
there is a danger of chilling free speech, the concern that constitutional adjudication be avoided
whenever possible may be outweighed by society’s interest in having the statute challenged.”); see
also Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2380 (2014) (internal quotations omitted) (citations omitted)
(“Speech involves matters of public concern when it can be fairly considered as relating to any matter
of political, social, or other concern to the community.”).
80. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003) (plurality opinion); see also Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976); see Police Dep’t of City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972) (“To
permit the continued building of our politics and culture, and to assure self-fulfillment for each
individual, our people are guaranteed the right to express any thought, free from government
censorship.”).
81. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 346 (1995) (internal quotations
omitted); see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983) (citations omitted) (“[T]he Court has
frequently reaffirmed that speech on public issues occupies the ‘highest rung of the hierarchy of First
Amendment values,’ and is entitled to special protection.”).
82. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 347 (emphasis added).
83. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
84. Id. at 268.
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that the risk and expense of liability would undoubtedly censor public
discussion and political debate, even if the speech was believed to be true,
the Court unanimously ruled that public officials may not recover for
defamatory statements relating to their official conduct unless they can
prove “actual malice,” a heightened standard requiring a showing of
“knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard for whether it was
false or not.” 85
Noting that “[i]t is as much [the citizen’s] duty to criticize as it is the
official’s duty to administer,” 86 the Court recognized a privileged right for
citizens to criticize their public officials to ensure that public debate be
“uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.” 87 He noted that the debate on public
issues “may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly
sharp attacks on government and public officials,” 88 and that, while false
and erroneous statements are inevitable, they too must be protected for the
freedom to have necessary “breathing space” to survive. 89
B.

Political Speech and the Executive Branch

Within the context of the Executive, the suppression of political
speech was further condemned by the Court in New York Times Co. v.
United States. 90 Claiming that the publication of the Pentagon Papers
would “endanger the national security,” President Nixon argued that “the
First Amendment was not intended to make it impossible for the
Executive to function or to protect the security of the United States.” 91 In
his concurrence, Justice Black considered this a “bold and dangerously
farreaching [sic] contention,” explaining that, “[t]o find that the President
has ‘inherent power’ to halt the publication of news by resort to the courts
would wipe out the First Amendment and destroy the fundamental liberty
and security of the very people the Government hopes to make ‘secure.’”92
Indeed, Justice Stewart drove this point home in his separate concurrence:

85. Id. at 279-80.
86. Id. at 282.
87. Id. at 270.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 271-72. The Court notes that “[e]ven a false statement may be deemed to make a
valuable contribution to public debate, since it brings about the clearer perception and livelier
impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.” Id. at 279 n.19 (citations omitted) (internal
quotations omitted).
90. 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
91. Id. at 718 (Black, J., concurring).
92. Id. at 718-19 (Black, J., concurring) (“[I]t was injunctions like those sought here that
Madison and his collaborators intended to outlaw in this Nation for all time.”).
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[T]he only effective restraint upon executive policy and power in the
areas of national defense and international affairs may lie in an
enlightened citizenry—in an informed and critical public opinion which
alone can here protect the values of democratic government. 93

The Court has found that a thriving democracy requires the open and
raw discussion and debate of public issues, politics, and the officials
involved in them. 94 “No form of speech is entitled to greater constitutional
protection” than political advocacy, even of a highly controversial
viewpoint. 95 The Court has explained that the purpose behind the First
Amendment is “to protect unpopular individuals from retaliation—and
their ideas from suppression—at the hand of an intolerant society.” 96
C.

Political Speech and New Technology

In Citizens United v. FEC, 97 the Court rejected the argument that the
history of the First Amendment does not extend its protection of political
speech to media corporations, reasoning:
[t]he Framers may have been unaware of certain types of speakers or
forms of communication, but that does not mean that those speakers and
media are entitled to less First Amendment protection than those types
of speakers and media that provided the means of communicating
political ideas when the Bill of Rights was adopted. 98

The Court refused to draw constitutional lines for the dissemination
of political speech throughout the development of new technology, for the
93. Id. at 728 (Stewart, J., concurring). This pronounced duty to the press later served an
important role in the exposure of President Nixon’s Watergate scandal less than a year later. See
Stephen F. Rohde, Presidential Power Free Press, 40 L.A. LAW. 26, 30 (2017).
94. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 341 (2010) (“[I]t is inherent
in the nature of the political process that voters must be free to obtain information from diverse sources
in order to determine how to cast their votes.”); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983) (“Speech
concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.”); Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976) (“In a republic where the people are sovereign, the ability of the
citizenry to make informed choices among candidates for office is essential, for the identities of those
who are elected will inevitably shape the course that we follow as a nation.”).
95. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995) (“That this advocacy
occurred in the heat of a controversial referendum vote only strengthens the protection afforded to
[political] expression.”).
96. Id. at 357 (acknowledging that the broad protection afforded to political speech may have
“unpalatable consequences,” society nonetheless “accords greater weight to the value of free speech
than to the dangers of its misuse.”).
97. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
98. Id. at 353-54 (noting that the great debates by the Federalists were “published and
expressed in the most important means of mass communication of that era—newspapers owned by
individuals.”).
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litigation and interpretive process in creating a bright-line rule would
inevitably chill protected speech and create questionable precedent.99
Nonetheless, “[t]he First Amendment was certainly not understood to
condone the suppression of political speech in society’s most salient
media.” 100 Thus, political speech is not precluded from being found in a
social media post, or even in more subtle forms such as a Facebook
“like.” 101
IV. PACKINGHAM AND ITS IMPACT ON A PUBLIC OFFICIAL’S SOCIAL
MEDIA
A.

Packingham v. North Carolina

The Supreme Court in Packingham v. North Carolina unanimously
struck down a statute issued to protect children from Internet predators by
prohibiting registered sex offenders from accessing social networking
sites. 102 Packingham is significant for Justice Kennedy’s majority
opinion, declaring the Internet to be the “modern public square.”103
However, the opinion has been criticized for its “expansive language” that
has “opened a Pandora’s box” for its implication that the public forum
doctrine applies to the Internet and social media, but “failing to account
for the hybrid public and private nature of digital realms.” 104
The majority’s opinion begins with a discussion of the First
Amendment’s protection of free speech in the “spatial context,” citing an
example of a “basic rule” that “a street or a park is a quintessential forum
for the exercise of First Amendment rights.” 105 Justice Kennedy then
notes that, “[w]hile in the past there may have been difficulty in
identifying the most important places (in a spatial sense) for the exchange

99. Id. at 326, 352 (“With the advent of the Internet and the decline of print and broadcast
media, moreover, the line between the media and others who wish to comment on political and social
issues becomes far more blurred.”).
100. Id. at 353.
101. See Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368 (4th Cir. 2013), as amended (Sept. 23, 2013) (finding
a Facebook “like” to be a constitutionally protected form of expression under the First Amendment);
Haleigh Jones, Public Officials’ Facebook “Likes”: The Case for Leaving Regulation of Official
“Likes” to the Torches and Pitchforks of Constituents, 18 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 263 (2015)
(explaining the political and commercial significance of a Facebook “like”).
102. 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017).
103. Id.
104. Note, First Amendment-Freedom of Speech-Public Forum Doctrine-Packingham v. North
Carolina, 131 HARV. L. REV. 233, 233 (2017).
105. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1735.
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of views, today the answer is clear. It is cyberspace—the ‘vast democratic
forums of the Internet’ in general, and social media in particular.” 106
The Court went on to explain the significance of social media’s
relationship with the First Amendment, citing Facebook for the free
expression of religion and politics; LinkedIn for seeking employment; and
Twitter for petitioning and engaging with local elected representatives.107
This information laid the backdrop to the Court’s finding that the North
Carolina statute’s language was overly broad because it prohibited access
to lawful websites that are “integral to the fabric of our modern society
and culture,” such as Google and Amazon. 108 The Court stated:
By prohibiting sex offenders from using those websites, North Carolina
with one broad stroke bars access to what for many are the principal
sources for knowing current events, checking ads for employment,
speaking and listening in the modern public square, and otherwise
exploring the vast realms of human thought and knowledge. These
websites can provide perhaps the most powerful mechanisms available
to a private citizen to make his or her voice heard. . . . [T]o foreclose
access to social media altogether is to prevent the user from engaging in
the legitimate exercise of First Amendment rights. 109

The majority’s opinion was criticized by Justice Alito in his
concurrence, labelling it “undisciplined dicta” and demonstrating concern
for “the implications of the Court’s unnecessary rhetoric” by equating the
“entirety of the internet with public streets and parks.” 110 Since the Court
previously held that “[t]he government does not create a forum by
inaction . . . but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for
public discourse,” 111 the majority’s comparison of social media to the
“quintessential public forum” of streets and parks adds more confusion to
the forum doctrine’s categorization. 112 Equating the Internet and social
media to parks and streets implies it is a traditional public forum open by
default and regardless of government intent, despite the Court’s prior
emphasis on historic tradition for traditional forum status. 113
106. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 868
(1997)).
107. Id. (noting that “Governors in all 50 States and almost every Member of Congress have set
up [Twitter] accounts for this purpose.”).
108. Id. at 1735, 1738.
109. Id. at 1737.
110. Id. at 1738 (Alito, J., concurring) (“The Court is unable to resist musings that seem to
equate the entirety of the internet with public streets and parks.”).
111. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985).
112. See Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1735.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 24-29.
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The Davison Cases

Prior to the Court’s decision in Packingham, a Loudoun County
resident filed suit against two public officials, the Commonwealth
Attorney and the Chair of the County’s Board of Supervisors, for deleting
his comments and blocking him off their respective Facebook pages. 114
The case against the Commonwealth Attorney, Davison v. Plowman, 115
was decided by a Virginia district court nearly four months prior to the
Packingham decision. There, the court found the official’s Facebook page
to be a limited public forum because the Loudoun County Social Media
Comments Policy served the restricted purpose of “present[ing] matters
of public interest in Loudoun County.” 116 It was thereby permitted the
reasonable, viewpoint-neutral regulation of speech that falls outside the
forum’s purpose. 117
The Commonwealth Attorney posted a link to an article he had
written concerning special prosecutors to his official Commonwealth
Attorney Facebook, whereby Davison “responded by posting a lengthy
comment that did not further any dialogue” regarding the article’s topic. 118
Rather, Davison claims that his comment was “political speech aimed at
informing the public of [the official’s] actions and to eventually have
[him] voted out of office.” 119 The court found this sufficient to fall outside
the scope of the limited forum and held that the comment’s removal “was
both viewpoint neutral and reasonably related to the purpose of the
forum.” 120
Four months later, the same court decided Davison v. Loudoun
County Board of Supervisors. 121 There, the Chair of Loudoun County
Board of Supervisors created a Facebook outside of the County’s official
channels so she would not be constrained to the County’s social media
policies, but titled the page as “Chair Phyllis J. Randall.” 122 Randall made
a post on her page concerning a discussion panel she attended, whereby
Davison responded with a comment alleging “corruption on the part of
114. See Davison v. Plowman, 247 F. Supp. 3d 767 (E.D. Va. 2017), aff’d, No. 17-1771, 2018
WL 1376887 (4th Cir. Mar. 19, 2018); Davison v. Loudoun Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d
702 (E.D. Va. 2017), appeal docketed, No. 17-2003 (4th Cir. Aug. 29, 2017).
115. 247 F. Supp. 3d. 767 (E.D. Va. 2017).
116. Id. at 777.
117. Id. at 776.
118. Id. at 777.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. 267 F. Supp. 3d 702 (E.D. Va. 2017), appeal docketed, No. 17-2003 (4th Cir. Aug. 29,
2017).
122. Id. at 707.
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Loudoun County’s School Board.” 123 Randall subsequently deleted the
post, including Davison’s comment, and banned Davison from her
Facebook page for twelve hours. 124 Citing Packingham and noting that
Randall’s posts requested open discussion on her page, the court
concluded that Randall had opened a public forum and engaged in
viewpoint discrimination by banning Davison from her Facebook page. 125
“By prohibiting Plaintiff from participating in her online forum because
she took offense at his claim . . . Defendant committed a cardinal sin
under the First Amendment.” 126
While both Davison cases involved the exclusion of a speaker based
on his content, Davison I 127 is distinguishable because the Commonwealth
Attorney was protected by the County’s social media policy, which placed
reasonable restrictions on speech that did not relate to the limited purpose
of the forum. 128 While the Chair official in Davison II 129 “purposely
created her Facebook page outside the County’s official channels so as to
not be constrained by the [County’s] policies,” 130 the court nonetheless
found the official to be acting under “color of law” and her ban to be
viewpoint discriminative. 131 Thus, whether the public official has a social
media policy is significant in finding the exclusion to be constitutional, so
long as it is reasonable. 132
C.

Being Blocked or Banned on Twitter

Unlike a Facebook “page”, where banning someone does not prevent
them from viewing the content posted by the page, 133 being “blocked” on
Twitter prevents the user from viewing the posts made by the Twitter

123. Id. at 711.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 716-17.
126. Id. at 717-18.
127. Plowman, 247 F. Supp. 3d 767.
128. Id. at 777.
129. Loudoun Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F.Supp.3d 702.
130. Id. at 707.
131. Id. at 717 (“Indeed, the suppression of critical commentary regarding elected officials is
the quintessential form of viewpoint discrimination against which the First Amendment guards.”).
132. See Liverman v. City of Petersburg, 844 F.3d 400, 411-12 (4th Cir. 2016) (finding
unconstitutional a police department’s social media policy prohibiting any negative comments “of
great public concern”).
133. Banning and Moderation, FACEBOOK HELP CENTER, https://www.facebook.com/help/
248844142141117/?helpref=hc_fnav (last visited Dec. 18, 2017).
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account entirely. 134 However, the user is only prevented from viewing the
Twitter account when he or she is logged in on the account blocked. 135 If
the user logs out, or logs in to a third party account, the user may still be
able to view the Twitter account he or she was previously blocked from. 136
The same is likely to be true for Facebook or any other social networking
site.
If users are still able to access a public official’s social media from
different accounts, is there really a deprivation of free speech when they
are blocked from one? This is where Packingham seems to have altered
the realm of First Amendment analysis to social media. Prior to
Packingham, the social media policy in Davison I protected the official’s
removal of plaintiff’s comment, but it did not permit the outright ban of
plaintiff from the official’s Facebook page. 137 The court distinguished
prior cases prohibiting a “blanket ban” from recurring public meetings,
which involved “entirely forecloses a means of communication” and a
failure to “leave adequate alternative channels of communication,” 138 to
plaintiff’s ban from the defendant’s page because he “could and did avail
himself of Facebook and other social media platforms to reach his
audience.” 139 The court was referring to plaintiff’s act of purchasing
Facebook ads, posting on his personal account, and creating new
Facebook and Twitter accounts to voice his message, 140 finding these
measures “adequate alternative measures of communication,” despite his
inability to comment directly on the defendant’s page. 141 The court found
that “any First Amendment right Plaintiff might have had to continue
posting comments on Defendant’s Facebook page” was protected by the
official’s qualified immunity. 142

134. How
to
block
accounts
on
Twitter,
TWITTER
HELP
CENTER,
https://help.twitter.com/en/using-twitter/blocking-and-unblocking-accounts (last visited Dec. 18,
2017).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See Davison v. Plowman, 247 F. Supp. 3d 767, 779-80 (E.D. Va. 2017), aff’d, No. 171771, 2018 WL 1376887 (4th Cir. Mar. 19, 2018).
138. Id. at 779 (citing Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Directors of the Panther Valley Sch. Dist., 143 F.
Supp. 3d 205 (M.D. Pa. 2015), aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded sub nom. Barna v. Bd. of Sch.
Directors of Panther Valley Sch. Dist., 877 F.3d 136 (3d Cir. 2017)).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 775.
141. Id. at 779 (“Plaintiff adduced little evidence at trial tending to show that those alternative
channels of communication were inadequate as compared to commenting directly on Defendant’s
Facebook page.”).
142. Id. at 780.
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The post-Packingham decision in Davison II demonstrated a
heightened interest in protecting the communication of plaintiff’s online
speech. Acknowledging that the twelve-hour ban from the defendant’s
Facebook page was “fairly minor” and that plaintiff’s speech was not
“suppressed in any meaningful sense,” the court nonetheless explained
that “the government violates the First Amendment by disfavoring
‘offensive’ speech in ways far milder than outright suppression.” 143
Despite the similarity in the content of the message conveyed by the
plaintiff in both cases, 144 the court in Davison II was quick to find
viewpoint discrimination in plaintiff’s exclusion from official’s Facebook
page. 145 A big factor in this conclusion is the absence of any social media
policy guiding the official’s exclusion, as there was in Davison I. 146
V. APPLICATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE PRESIDENT’S
SOCIAL MEDIA
It was not long after the decision in Packingham was rendered that a
lawsuit was filed against President Donald Trump for the alleged blocking
of users from his Twitter account, @realDonaldTrump. 147 The plaintiffs
contend that the President blocked them “because of opinions they
expressed in replies to the President’s tweets,” which consequentially
prevented them from viewing, replying, and joining the public discussion
associated with the President’s posts. 148 Requesting declaratory and
injunctive relief, the Complaint alleges that the President deprived not
only the plaintiffs’ right to engage in the President’s Twitter discussions,
but also deprived other Twitter users from reading the speech of those
blocked. 149
143. Davison v. Loudoun Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 718 (E.D. Va. 2017)
(citation omitted).
144. In Davison I, the comment related to alleged perjury on part of a Loudoun County school
official and asks “[w]hy wouldn’t you at least assign a special prosecutor in this case?” Plowman, 247
F. Supp. 3d at 773. The court disregarded the comment’s reference to special prosecutors, labelling it
“mere window dressing” to address his “frustration that Defendant refused to pursue Plaintiff’s claims
of perjury.” Id. at 777. In Davison II, neither party knew the exact comment’s content, but the
defendant recalled it “included allegations of corruption on the part of Loudoun County’s School
Board.” See Loudoun Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 711.
145. Loudoun Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 718.
146. Id. (“Neutral, comprehensive social media policies like that maintained by Loudoun
County . . . may provide vital guidance for public officials and commenters alike . . .”).
147. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 4, at 2.
148. Id. at 2-3.
149. Id. at 3; see City of San Diego, Cal. v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82 (2004) (“The interest at stake
is as much the public’s interest in receiving informed opinion as it is the [person’s] own right to
disseminate it.”).
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Silencing opposing speakers by restricting access to a forum they
have a constitutional right to be in would undoubtedly chill speech, as
users would risk losing access to the President’s Twitter by voicing their
objections to his position on a matter of public concern. First Amendment
protection is afforded to both speaker and the listener, who each enjoy a
privileged right to participate in discussion of the President and his
qualifications for future elections. 150 The Supreme Court has made clear
“it is inherent in the nature of the political process that voters must be free
to obtain information from diverse sources in order to determine how to
cast their votes.” 151 However, finding a constitutional violation requires
the determination of whether the President has created a public forum
through his social media account.
A.

The President’s Twitter: @realDonaldTrump

The Twitter account, @realDonaldTrump, is commonly used by the
President and his Administration 152 to announce government policy, share
his anticipated actions on important public and political issues, and to
voice his opinion on matters relating to both his official and personal
capacities. 153 The account has over 44.9 million followers that engage in
the discussion of the President’s posts (called “tweets”) by replying (or
“retweeting”) to his original response and making their opinions viewable
to other Twitter users. 154 On its face, the @realDonaldTrump account
seems to be maintained by the President in his official capacity,
identifying himself as the “45th President of the United States of

150. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 13 (1976) (“Discussion of public issues and debate on
the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the system of government established
by our Constitution.”); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 341 (2010) (“The
First Amendment protects speech and speaker, and the ideas that flow from each.”).
151. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 341.
152. Dan Scavino, the White House Director of Social Media, is known to occasionally tweet
for the President from his @realDonaldTrump account. See Eliana Johnson, Dan Scavino is the other
@realDonaldTrump, POLITICO (June 10, 2017, 7:22 AM), https://www.politico.com/
story/2017/06/10/dan-scavino-trump-social-media-profile-239381 [https://perma.cc/G49B-U6RV].
153. See generally Amanda Wills & Alysha Love, All the President’s tweets, CNN POLITICS
(last updated April 8, 2018, 9:12 AM), http://www.cnn.com/interactive/2017/politics/trump-tweets/
[https://perma.cc/UAY9-E7TH].
154. See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump (last visited Dec. 19, 2017). Since his election, the President has tweeted over 2,461
times, posting an average of six to seven times a day; Jessica Estepa, Trump has tweeted 2,461 times
since the election. Here’s a breakdown of his Twitter use, USA TODAY: ON POLITICS NEWSLETTER,
(last
updated
Nov.
8,
2017,
12:26
PM)
https://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/politics/onpolitics/2017/11/07/trump-has-tweeted-2-461-times-since-election-heresbreakdown-his-twitter-use/822312001/ [https://perma.cc/TE5D-AFWU].
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America” beneath his name. 155 The President’s tweets from the
@realDonaldTrump account have even been deemed “official
statements” of the President of the United States by former White House
Press Secretary Sean Spicer, 156 the Department of Justice, 157 the Ninth
Circuit, 158 and President Trump himself. 159
A separate account designated for the President of the United States,
@POTUS, was created and used by President Barack Obama back in
2015. 160 While President Trump is featured on the page, he appears to
only use the account to retweet posts made by @realDonaldTrump and
other accounts associated with his Administration. 161 In a section beneath
the name “President Trump” on the @POTUS account, there is a link to
the @realDonaldTrump account, as well as a link to the official White
House Privacy Policy. 162 The Policy has a section beneath the heading
“Third-Party Websites” stating, “The White House maintains official
pages or accounts on third-party websites in order to better engage with
the American public.” 163 While the Policy does not state which accounts

155. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), supra note 154.
156. Elizabeth Landers, White House: Trump’s tweets are ‘official statements’, CNN POLITICS,
(last updated June 6, 2017, 4:37 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/06/politics/trump-tweets-officialstatements/index.html [https://perma.cc/URZ6-CE72].
157. Defendant’s Supplemental Submission and Further Response to Plaintiffs’ Post-Briefing
Notices at 4, James Madison Project v. DOJ, No. 1:17-cv-144-APM (D.D.C. Nov. 13, 2017),
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/4200037/Trump-Twitter-20171113.pdf.
158. Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 773 n.14 (9th Cir. 2017) cert. granted sub nom. Trump v.
Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017), and cert. granted, judgment vacated, 138 S.
Ct. 377 (2017), and vacated, 874 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2017)(citing President Trump’s tweet to support
invalidating the President’s executive order prohibiting nationals from six designated countries from
entering the United States).
159. See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 1, 2017, 3:41 PM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/881281755017355264 (referring to his use of social
media as “MODERN DAY PRESIDENTIAL”).
160. Roberta Rampton, Obama gets his own account on Twitter: ‘It’s Barack. Really!’,
REUTERS (May 18, 2015 12:35 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-obama-twitter/obama-getshis-own-account-on-twitter-its-barack-really-idUSL1N0Y915O20150518 [https://perma.cc/T5YKKFCJ].
161. See President Trump (@POTUS), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/POTUS (last visited Dec.
19, 2017).
162. Id.
163. Privacy Policy, WHITEHOUSE.GOV, https://www.whitehouse.gov/privacy-policy/ (last
updated Dec. 13, 2017) (changed to lowercase). It also states that the “White House archives some
information that users submit or publish when engaging with the White House through official White
House pages or accounts on third-party websites (e.g., by sending a message, posting a comment,
‘following,’ ‘friending,’ or taking similar actions).” Id.
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are the “official White House accounts,” it may be presumed that they are
those accounts that link to the Privacy Policy on the main page. 164
B.

Public Forum or Personal Account?

The Privacy Policy’s statement that these accounts are used to “better
engage with the American public” would satisfy the government intent
requirement to open a public forum on those accounts linking to the
Policy, but does not indicate any limitations on speech as the policy in
Davison I did. 165 Nevertheless, is the absence of the Policy from the
President’s @realDonaldTrump account an indication that he did not
intend to open a public forum? After all, @realDonaldTrump was created
long before Donald Trump was elected President, 166 and the Supreme
Court has held that the First Amendment protects a public employee’s
right to speak as a citizen on matters of public concern.167 While the
President’s own First Amendment rights are still afforded protection, an
exception exists for public officials who “make statements pursuant to
their official duties.” 168 However, the Court has clarified that the proper
inquiry is “whether the speech at issue is itself ordinarily within the scope
of an employee’s duties, not whether it merely concerns those duties.” 169
Even assuming the account is Donald Trump’s personal Twitter, the
President’s status as the highest-ranked public official should require an
affirmative showing of such to ensure his account is not viewed as a public
forum welcoming open discussion. 170 Moreover, the Supreme Court has
164. See e.g., President Donald Trump (@POTUS), supra note 161; The White House
(@WhiteHouse), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/WhiteHouse (last visited Dec. 19, 2017); Vice
President Mike Pence (@VP), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/VP (last visited Dec. 19, 2017). Vice
President Mike Pence also seems to have a second Twitter account that does not feature the Privacy
Policy. Mike Pence (@mike_pence), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/mike_pence (last visited Dec. 19,
2017).
165. The social media policy in Plowman reserved the right to “delete submissions that violated
the enumerated rules,” namely, comments that were “clearly off topic.” Davison v. Plowman, 247 F.
Supp. 3d 767, 772 (E.D. Va. 2017) (internal quotations omitted).
166. Donald J. Trump, supra note 154 (indicating the account was created in March 2009).
167. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417 (2006) (“[P]ublic employees do not surrender
all their First Amendment rights by reason of their employment.”). A public official has been regarded
as a public employee whose position would “invite public scrutiny and discussion of the person
holding it.” Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 n.13 (1966).
168. Id. at 421.
169. Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2379 (2014); see Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 423 (“Employees
who make public statements outside the course of performing their official duties retain some
possibility of First Amendment protection because that is the kind of activity engaged in by citizens
who do not work for the government”).
170. As Professor Norton observed, “certain positions trigger such high public expectations that
those employees could never escape their governmental role to speak purely as private citizens even
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demonstrated a strong interest in protecting the public’s right to criticize
public officials. 171 The Court in Rosenblatt v. Baer stated:
There is, first, a strong interest in debate on public issues, and, second,
a strong interest in debate about those persons who are in a position
significantly to influence the resolution of those issues. Criticism of
government is at the very center of the constitutionally protected area of
free discussion. Criticism of those responsible for government
operations must be free, lest criticism of government itself be
penalized. 172

Because the President holds a title of political and public importance,
the public should be free to not only criticize him, but also observe his
engagement with the general public in order to determine his
qualifications as an elected official.173 By blocking users for their
criticism of his official conduct, the President not only engages in
viewpoint discrimination, but also censorship of constitutionallyprotected political speech. 174 Any individual interest the President had is
substantially outweighed by the selective suppression of speech from the
public discussion he engages in on his publicly-accessible online
forum. 175 Therefore, public forum status should be assigned to the
President’s Twitter, @realDonaldTrump. 176 To hold otherwise would

when off the job.” See Helen Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government’s Control
of its Worker’s Speech to Protect its Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1, 50 (2009); id. at 59-60
(explaining how a contextual approach would consider the nature of the speaker’s occupation in
assessing whether the public employee is speaking as a citizen or on behalf of his or her employer).
171. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 299 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (“In
a democratic society, one who assumes to act for the citizens in an executive, legislative, or judicial
capacity must expect that his official acts will be commented upon and criticized.”).
172. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966).
173. Id. at 86 (“Where a position in government has such apparent importance that the public
has an independent interest in the qualifications and performance of the person who holds it, beyond
the general public interest in the qualifications and performance of all government employees, both
elements we identified in [Sullivan] are present.”).
174. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 297 (Black, J., concurring) (“For a representative democracy
ceases to exist the moment that the public functionaries are by any means absolved from their
responsibility to their constituents; and this happens whenever the constituent can be restrained in any
manner from speaking, writing, or publishing his opinions upon any public measure, or upon the
conduct of those who may advise or execute it.” (citation omitted)).
175. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 326-27 (2010) (explaining
that First Amendment standards “must give the benefit of any doubt to protecting rather than stifling
speech.” (quoting Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right To Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469 (2007)).
176. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736 (2017) (“[T]he Court must
exercise extreme caution before suggesting that the First Amendment provides scant protection for
access to vast networks in that medium.”).
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chill “speech that is central to the meaning and purpose of the First
Amendment.” 177
C.

A New Approach

This Note proposes that a public forum presumption be assigned to
the social media accounts of public officials that are highly ranked and
maintain social media accounts within their official capacities.
Packingham furthers this approach, given its heightened stance on the
protection afforded to social media and deeming it as the “most
important” place to exercise free expression.178 With the massive, lowcost, and easily accessible spatial dimension of the Internet, a heightened
standard is appropriate where a public forum would otherwise be opened
in an area inaccessible to certain speakers.179 Therefore, the higher up in
government a public official is, the greater the presumption should be that
his or her social media is a public forum, absent affirmative indications
that he or she intended to keep the account private.
VI. CONCLUSION
While Packingham v. North Carolina gave hope to bringing clarity
to the public forum doctrine’s application to social media, the decision
may have stirred up more confusion in the application of the doctrine’s
three categories. Nonetheless, Packingham signifies a coming-of-age
perspective to the constitutional protection afforded to online speech,
indicating a challenge for public officials to show that their social media
pages are either limited forums or personal accounts before choosing to
exclude users’ comments or ban them entirely. However, the higher up in
the government hierarchy the public official stands, the greater the
government’s burden should be to demonstrate that his or her social media
are nonpublic or private accounts. The implications of the President’s
social media bans are far greater than they would be if he wasn’t serving
as the public’s highest-elected official. By excluding speakers for their
criticism of his official conduct, the President is impeding on the First
Amendment’s core by suppressing political speech that is necessary for
democracy to function efficiently.

177. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. at 329.
178. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1735.
179. Id. at 1737 (“[Social media] allow a person with an Internet connection to ‘become a town
crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any soapbox.’” (quoting Reno v. Am. Civil
Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997)).

